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THE DOUGLAS CONCEPT OF GOD IN GOVERNMENT
LEONARD F. M ANNING*
Only a few days after he stepped onto a wind-wrapped Washington
airport to ask of the American people "your help-and God's,"1
President Johnson issued a proclamation. It read,
One of the last messages of John Fitzgerald Kennedy to his fellow
countrymen was the Thanksgiving Day proclamation which he issued
on Nov. 4, 1963. I urge that this proclamation be read in the churches
of the United States in their services on Nov. 28 as a memorial to
him .... We dedicate Thanksgiving Day, as we have for over 300
years, as a day to give thanks to God for his gifts and the sustenance
which he has provided in undertaking the tasks of our nation.
2
President Kennedy's proclamation, thus promulgated by his suc-
cessor, spoke of a religious heritage with roots, over three centuries
old, in Virginia and Massachusetts. It recalled the proclamation of
our first President in the first year of his first administration, a pro-
nouncement which proclaimed Nov. 26, 1789 as "a day of public
thanksgiving and prayer to be observed by acknowledging with
grateful hearts the many signal favors of Almighty God." It spoke of
President Lincoln's Thanksgiving proclamation which sought deliver-
ance from the "ordeal of fraternal war." It noted the nation's growing
powers and pointed to the perils which accompany power. It offered
thanks to God for our blessings, asked His protection against our
perils and concluded,
Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States
of America, in consonance with the joint resolution of the Congress
approved Dec. 26, 1941, 55 Stat. 862 (5 U.S.C. 87B), designating the
fourth Thursday of November in each year as Thanksgiving Day, do
hereby proclaim Thursday, Nov. 28, 1963, as a day of national thanks-
giving.
On that day let us gather in sanctuaries dedicated to worship and in
homes blessed by family affection to express our gratitude for the
glorious gifts of God; and let us earnestly and humbly pray that he
will continue to guide and sustain us in the great unfinished tasks of
achieving peace, justice, and understanding among all men and nations
and of ending misery and suffering wherever they exist.3
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
'President Johnson's brief remarks made on his return from Dallas were carried
live on all television networks on Nov. 22, 1963 and reported in Nov. 23, 1963 editions
of the press. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1963, p. 1, col. 2 & 3 (caption under
picture).2 N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 27, 1963, p. 10, col. 1. 3 Ibid.
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No one, I am sure, would ever indict the late President for ignor-
ance of history. When he spoke of our religious heritage, as did Mr.
Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson,4 he knew whereof he spoke.
So we nodded and accepted this posthumous precept to gather in
churches. We accepted it as something of an American tradition and
those of us who sought neither sanctity nor simple peace of mind in
"sanctuaries dedicated to worship" went about our business-
unmolested, uncoerced. We went about our business to pray, if we
wished, when we wished to pray, to play if we wished or to patch a
fence or repair a rickety bicycle or poke a finger against a frozen lawn,
always secure in the thought that we were doing only what we our-
selves desired to do.
But lost in the senseless tragedy of the moment and the momentous
and intransient shock of the President's assassination was a larger
lesson to be read in the presidential proclamation. Not too many
months before, Engel v. Vitale' had been decided. In Engel, the
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a non-compulsory, state-spon-
sored prayer which recognized our dependence on God and asked His
blessings "upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country. '8
Writing for the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice Black had told us
that "it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers,"' that neither the power nor the prestige of government can
be used "to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the
American people can say,"8 that "religion is too personal, too sacred,
too holy to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate"'
and that "each separate government in this country should stay out of
the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that
purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the
people choose to look to for religious guidance."'"
Engel v. Vitale stirred a national storm"l and the dust has not yet
4 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
5 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
6 Id. at 422.
7 Id. at 425.
8 Id. at 429.
9 Id. at 432.
1o Id. at 435.
" Almost literally, at least for television viewers. The CBS Television Network
presented a two-part documentary, "Storm Over the Supreme Court," on Feb. 20,
1963 and March 13, 1963. The documentary was subsequently printed and published
(undated) by CBS News. After the Court's decision a torrent of comment poured
from the pages of U.S. press. The N.Y. Times and the N.Y. Herald Tribune of
June 26, 1962 reported the decision in banner headlines. I doubt that any newspaper
in the nation neglected it on its editorial page. Most reported the reactions of "the
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settled. 2 Indeed, one sometimes wonders whether more time was not
spent in protest than ever was spent in prayer, and more fervor found
in conclaves called to damn the Court than was ever found in church
or tabernacle.12 Nonetheless, Congressman Becker of New York
spoke for a startled society when he called "the ruling a grave dis-
aster... the decision a sad day in the history -of our country." 4
Congressman Becker spoke for a startled society which had but belated
reason to be startled. If there were cause for concern the cause arose
in 1947 and concern may well have been barred by laches. For,
accepting the philosophy of Everson 5 and its effect in McCollum,6
Engel was inevitable. In Everson Mr. Justice Black had written,
man in the street" as well as those of churchmen, public officials, educators, business-
men and students in school. I believe it was a reporter for the Los Angeles Times
who composed "A Child's Prayer." It read,
"Now I lay me down to sleep.
I pray the State my soul to keep
If I should die before I wake
I hope the Court made no mistake."
See also, Time, Vol. 81, No. 26 (June 29, 1963), p. 13 et. seq. and note 13 infra.
12A score of amendments of various types have been introduced in Congress to
reverse or limit the effect of the school prayer decision. Hearings on several such
proposals were held by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary but no further action
has been taken there. The House Committee on the Judiciary, under the chairman-
ship of Representative Emmanuel Celler, has taken no action at all. To force House
action on proposed amendments filed with the Judiciary Committee, Representative
Frank J. Becker filed a discharge petition on July 9, 1963, to bring to the floor of
the house H.RIJ. Res. 693, a proposed amendment filed with the Committee and
concurred in by Representatives Becker, Walter S. Baring, William C. Cramer,
Horace R. Kornegay, Delbert L. Latta and Don Fuqua. See H.R.J. Res. 693, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. There were also recent reactions in Congress apart from amendment
resolutions. See H.R. 7252 introduced June 25, 1963 by Rep. Robert T. Ashmore, a
bill recommending the inscription of the words, "In God We Trust," in gold letters
above the bench of the Supreme Court. Rep. Ashmore's speech criticizing Mr. Chief
Justice Warren's opposition (on aesthetical grounds) appears in the Congressional
Record of Nov. 12, 1963. (88 Cong., 1st Sess.).
'1 This is not at all intended to disparage the motives or the sincerity of any who
were critical of the Court's decision. Indeed, it could not be. For, as reported in the
N.Y. Times and N.Y. Herald Tribune in their editions of June 26 and June 27, 1962,
the Cardinal Archbishop of New York, Francis Cardinal Spellman, expressed shock.
Bishop James A. Pike, the Methodist Bishop of California, stated that the Court
"had deconsecrated the nation." (See "Storm Over the Supreme Court," p. 67, note
11 supra) and the Rev. Billy Graham expressed similar sentiments. Others were
quick to express concern as well. While President Kennedy, with executive decorum,
remained impassive (see report of the President's press conference of June 29, 1962,
N.Y. Times, June 30, 1962 and "Storm Over the Supreme Court," p. 67, note 11
supra) both President Hoover and President Eisenhower were of the opinion that
the Court had made a mistake. Some there were who were less restrained. Repre-
sentative George W. Andrews declaimed, "They put the Negroes in the schools-
now they put God out of the schools." "Storm Over the Supreme Court," p. 66,
note 11 supra.
14 N.Y. Herald Tribune, June 26, 1962.
15 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
is McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.,-
And in McCollum he found "an establishment" in the religious instruc-
tion given in a public elementary school to those who chose to be so
instructed. The Court had there condemned state laws or local rules
designed to promote "religion" in preference to irreligion. If, as
McCollum found, the teaching of religion serves no secular purpose
how could the recitation of a prayer, howsoever non-denominational,
be anything if not exclusively religious in purpose, in essence and in
effect?
Could it be that the protests provoked by Engel were engendered
not so much by what the Court held or by what Mr. Justice Black
wrote as they were by the absolutist, all-encompassing sweep of Mr.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion? 8 After all, Mr. Justice Douglas
had been the author of "accommodations" for religion" and he had
quite clearly and forthrightly proclaimed that "We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."2 But now in
Engel, as though there were more fundamental questions which de-
manded more fundamental answers, Mr. Justice Douglas suddenly
"grew half sick of shadows"'" and gave sun-bright answers for just
about all our "religion problems" and unequivocal castigation of all
religious customs which are even tenuously related to government.
Wrote he,
1"330 U.S. at 15-16.
18 370 U.S. 421, 437.
19 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).201d. at 313.
21 The phrase is not intended to imply that Mr. Justice Douglas, like the Lady of
Shallott, could not bear to look at things as they were nor is any suggestion made
that he became accursed. Tennyson's Lady, though, did cause a stir when she left her
loom. We are told, Out flew the web and floated wide
The mirror cracked from side to side.
"The curse is come upon me," cried
The Lady of Shallott.
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It is customary in deciding a constitutional question to treat it in its
narrowest form. Yet at times the setting of the question gives it a
form and content which no abstract treatment could give. The point
for decision is whether the Government can constitutionally finance
a religious exercise. Our system at the federal and state levels is
presently honeycombed with such financing. Nevertheless, I think it
is an unconstitutional undertaking whatever form it takes.22
To make certain that we felt the full impact and sense of what he said,
he added a footnote of specifics:
There are many "aids" to religion in this country at all levels of
government. To mention but a few at the federal level, one might
begin by observing that the very First Congress which wrote the First
Amendment provided for chaplains in both Houses and in the armed
services. There is compulsory chapel at the service academies, and
religious services are held in federal hospitals and prisons. The Presi-
dent issues religious proclamations. The Bible is used for the admin-
istration of oaths. N.Y.A. and W.P.A. funds were available to
parochial schools during the depression. Veterans receiving money
under the "G.I." Bill of 1944 [38 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq.] could
attend denominational schools, to which payments were made directly
by the government. During World War II, federal money was con-
tributed to denominational schools for the training of nurses. The
benefits of the National School Lunch Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 1751 et
seq.] are available to students in private as well as public schools.
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 [42 U.S.C.A.
§ 291 et seq.] specifically made money available to non-public hos-
pitals. The slogan "In God We Trust" is used by the Treasury
Department, and Congress recently added God to the pledge of alle-
giance. There is Bible-reading in the schools of the District of Colum-
bia, and religious instruction is given in the District's National
Training School for Boys. Religious organizations are exempt from
the federal income tax and are granted postal privileges. Up to defined
limits-15 per cent of the adjusted gross income of individuals and
5 per cent of the net income of corporations-contributions to religious
organizations are deductible for federal income tax purposes. There
are no limits to the deductibility of gifts and bequests to religious
institutions made under the federal gift and estate tax laws. This
list of federal "aids" could easily be expanded, and of course there is
a long list in each state. Fellman, The Limits of Freedom (1959),
pp. 40-41.23
And finally, the significance was sealed with a reference to Mr.
Justice Rutledge,
22 370 U.S. at 437.23Ibid. (note 1).
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My problem today would be uncomplicated but for Everson v.
Board of Education ... which allowed taxpayers' money to be used
to pay "the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general
program under which" the fares of pupils attending public and other
schools were also paid. The Everson case seems in retrospect to be
out of line with the First Amendment. Its result is appealing, as it
allows aid to be given to needy children. Yet by the same token,
public funds could be used to satisfy other needs of children in
parochial schools lunches, books, and tuition being obvious examples.
Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in dissent what I think is durable First
Amendment philosophy. .... 24
In the afterglow of Engel is it not strange that both the last pro-
mulgated proclamation of President Kennedy and the first proclama-
tion of President Johnson should urge us to pray to Almighty God?
Would it be facetious to suggest that they chose to exercise a pristine
Presidential prerogative of ignoring the court?2" Would it be caustic
to inquire whether they did so out of deference to the first Democrat,
Thomas Jefferson? It is an interesting paradox that Mr. Jefferson,
from whom the Court borrowed its metaphorical wall of separation
between Church and State26 and upon whose writings it has put
primordial reliance to find the meaning of establishment 2 7 had on
many occasions many unkind thoughts about the judiciary. "They
[the federal judges]", Mr. Jefferson wrote to Edward Livingston in
1825, "are practicing on the Constitution by inferences, analogies,
and sophisms, as they would on an ordinary law... it [the Court]
has proved that the power of declaring what the law is, ad libitum, by
sapping and mining, slyly, and without alarm, the foundations of the
Constitution can do what open force would not dare to attempt.
28
Or would it be cynical to suppose that the President, in each instance,
24 Id. at 443.
25There may be much of myth to the story that Andrew Jackson as President
stated: "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it," but there is
abundant evidence that he denied the authority of the Court and history records that
Jefferson and Lincoln as well distrusted the Court. Wilson tried a hand at liberalizing
it and Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to reorganize it. Jackson, The Struggle for
Judicial Supremacy, ix-x (1941).
26 Letter to Danbury, Connecticut, Baptist Association, Jan. 1, 1802, 8 JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS 113 (Washington ed. 1861). Jefferson's letter was first quoted by the
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).27 See, e.g., McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ; and Everson v.
Board of Educ., note 15 supra.
28 XVI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 113-14 (Lipscomb & Bergh ed. 1903).
Similar statements by Jefferson appear in his letter to William T. Barry, id., XV, p.
388-390, and in his letter to Spencer Roane, X THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
184 (Ford ed. 1892). Jefferson was in these instances objecting to the centralization
of federal power and the "usurpation" of state power. HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON
RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION, 81-3 (1962).
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with a sensitive finger-if not a thumb-on the political pulse of the
nation, preferred the popular reaction to the Prayer decision to the
dictates of the Constitution?
Or should we wonder at and challenge the wisdom of Mr. Justice
Douglas' all-encompassing concurrence? Should a President feel
constrained by the Court's implied disapproval and a Justice's express
condemnation of Thanksgiving Proclamations? I think not. And I
would submit that in this instance, and on the subject of "an establish-
ment of religion" generally, Mr. Justice Douglas contradicts the
"liberal philosophy" he has always been among the first to espouse.
DOUGLAS AND REL GIOUS LiBERTY
"The United States, we say, stands for freedom," Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote only a few years ago."0 There is no doubt that in his
twenty-five years on the High Court he has made a career of inspect-
ing and polishing every facet of that freedom. He is the classic
American individualist ready to question anew every obligation of
citizen to government wherever and whoever the citizen may be and
wherever and whatever the government might be. Never provincial
in his protestations against tyranny, he has become, as it were,
freedom's counsellor for the world and he has found his precedents in
the opinions of Mukhersea as well as Marshall,"' to scorn not only a
Stuart King but a Kwame Nkrumah decreeing a bill of attainder, 2 an
Ayub for his "precautionary arrests, '33 a South Korean military junta
and its ex post facto edicts, 4 and even a Soviet press which silenced
Yevtushenko's lament for "Babi Yar." 35
Equally vocal in defense of religious liberty, he has said, "Jefferson
agreed with Locke that a pagan or atheist, like Christians, Jews or
Moslems should not be excluded from the 'civil rights' of the state
because of his religion" 3 -- a page or view of history which requires
29The first amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.....30 DouGrAs, A LVING BILL OF RIGHTS, 9 (1961).
L DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES (1955). WE THE JUDGES comprises the Tagore
Lectures given by Mr. Justice Douglas at the University of Calcutta in July, 1955.
They discuss the principal decisions not only of the United States Supreme Court but
also those of the High Courts of India.32 THE GREAT RIGHTS, 117 (Cahn ed. 1963). Chapter 6 of THE GREAT RIGHTS
contains the James Madison Lecture, entitled "The Bill of Rights Is Not Enough,"
delivered by Mr. Justice Douglas last year at New York University.33 Ibid.
84 DOUGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF LIBERTY, 4 (1963).
35 Id. at 18-19.3 6 DOUGLAS, A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS, 32 (1961).
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him, and government, to respect the scruples of the Sikh or Moslem"7
and of all who turn toward "the path of Buddha."
His wanderings have been along the weed-grown beds of the
Chesapeake and Ohio barge canal as well as the lofty plateaus "beyond
the high Himalayas," and here at home Mr. Justice Douglas has been
a consistent and persistent apostle of that same religious liberty.
While some may find in the premise of Murdock v. Pennsylvania"P-
"The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age old form of mis-
sionary evangelism .... Its purpose is as evangelical as the revival
meeting. This form of religious activity occupies the same high
estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and
preaching from the pulpits" 4 -- a triumph of style over substance, once
the premise is taken, there are a few who would question the wisdom of
Mr. Justice Douglas' majority view. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, deny-
ing the state the right to require a license of the religious colporteur,
had a double effect. It looked "before and after." It rejected the
Court's reasoning in Jones v. Opelika41 (a case in which Douglas had
dissented)42 and fixed the Court's philosophy for its later decisions,
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette," United States v.
Ballard,44 Giroud v. United States," Saia v. New York4" and Fowler
v. Rhode Island,7 in all but the first of which Mr. Justice Douglas
wrote for the majority of the Court. Douglas had already confessed,
dissenting in Jones v. Opelika," his grievious sin of joining with the
majority of the Court in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis.49 Gobitis
had sanctioned the expulsion of a child, from public elementary
school, who, because of a religious conviction that it was a graven
image, refused to salute the American flag. Having confessed, Douglas
made public retribution in Barnette where he joined in the majority
opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson to overrule Gobitis. In Barnette, Mr.
37 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 411 (1963).
38 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 564 (1960).
39 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
40 Id. at 108-109.
41316 U.S. 584 (1942).
42 Douglas joined in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Stone, id. at 600,
and in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy, id. at 611, and also added a
joint dissenting comment in conjunction with Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Murphy, id. at 623.
43 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
44322 U.S. 78 (1944).
45 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
46334 U.S. 558 (1948).
47 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
48 316 U.S. at 623.
49 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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Justice Jackson wrote what is a lyrical but compact summary of
principles of which Mr. Justice Douglas hoped that we might never
lose sight,"0
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.,1
Douglas has echoed the same thought, but gives a reason which reaches
beyond the Constitution. He wrote, in The Right of the People,
Man is a child of God entitled to dignified treatment. The state is
the servant of the citizen, not the all-powerful being that can require
the citizen to do its bidding or suffer the consequences.52
Thus, he caught a concept which protects the colporteur who peddles
his pamphlets on the Boston common,53 the Jehovah's Witness who
preaches from a sound truck on the streets of New York5 or evangel-
izes in a public park in Pawtucket, Rhode Island" or who carries his
preaching and proselyting to his neighbor's doorstep. 6 It is a philos-
ophy of freedom which commands the state to accept as a citizen one
who, compelled by religious convictions, declines to bear arms to
defend the United States, 7 a philosophy which will not acquiesce in
the Court's refusal to admit the pacificist to the practice of law5" or
to a state university. 5 It is a credo which questions the state's right
to outlaw polygamy with respect to those for whom polygamy is a
religious profession, 0 which tolerates the individual's right to believe
the obviously absurd and refuses to put to proof of her beliefs the
"religious" fund-raiser who asserts supernatural power to cure the
incurable and claims to be, among others sainted or otherwise incom-
50 DOUGLAs, A LMNG BILL OF RIGHTS, 33 (1961); DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE
PEoPLE, Lecture II, ch. III, 106 (1958).
51 West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
5
2 DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 50, Lecture II, 145.
53 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra note 39 and compare Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
54 See Saia v. New York, supra note 46.
55 See Fowler v. Rhode Island, supra note 47.
56 See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
57See Giroud v. United States, supra note 45.58 Douglas concurred with Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in In re Summers, 325
U.S. 561, 573, (1945). He criticized the majority holding of Surniners in THE RIGHT
OF THE PEOPLE, Lecture II, 141 (1958).
591d. at 142 wherein Douglas criticizes the Court's decision in Hamilton v.
Board of Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
60 The "polygamy" cases are Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), and
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). Douglas has said that the Reynolds case
states a dangerous test. DOUGLAS, THE: ANATOMY OF LIBERTY, 27 (1963).
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municado, St. Germain, Jesus, Joan of Arc, George Washington and
Lotus Ray King.6' In United States v. Ballard Mr. Justice Douglas
wrote for himself and four colleagues:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to
the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences
which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.
Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean
that they can be made suspect before the law. Many take their gospel
from the New Testament. But it would hardly be supposed that they
could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining
whether those teachings contained false representations. The miracles
of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the
power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If one
could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found
those teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom.
The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and
extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement
among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all
men would agree. They fashioned a charter of government which
envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views. Man's
relation to his God was made no concern of the state. He was granted
the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the
verity of his religious views. The religious views espoused by re-
spondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people.
But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with
finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the
religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that
task, they enter a forbidden domain.6 1
Douglas and the Court are here concerned with the state's invasion
of personal liberty, with governmental control of conscience, with, as it
were, governmental interference in the affairs of God. But there is
another side to the coin. Does God have any right to be present in
the affairs of government? The Constitution inscribes the coin in
terms of "free exercise" and "establishment." The first amendment
provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...."
It may be fairly said that Mr. Justice Douglas has become the Court's
spokesman of "free exercise." In his liberal adherence, judicially and
extra-judicially, to almost absolute religious liberty he has acquired a
61 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) and see Record, p. 2.
62 322 U.S. at p. 86-7. Is the issue here one of putting the defendant to proof of
her beliefs (as Douglas states it) or is it one of putting her to proof of the sincerity
of her beliefs?
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loyal and cultic following and one might hesitate to charge him in the
area of "establishment" with the subversion of liberty. Here Douglas
is travelling in Hugo Black country. Mr. Justice Black, the author of
Everson," McCollum,64 Torcaso"5 and Engel," and himself a vaunted
avatar of religious liberty, has become the precedent-precisioning
prophet of "establishment" or, more accurately, "disestablishment."
Mr. Justice Douglas has never hesitated, however, to spell out his
credo. He has chosen on several occasions to put it in lecture and in
book, to engage in extra-curricular, as it were, and sometimes academic
debate." But in his Engel concurrence, as noted above, he has given
us enough to take pause. It is a fair and fairly complete summation of
the Douglas concept of establishment. But Engel must be read in the
light of Everson and Everson itself against the distant glow of the
establishment cases which preceded it.
ESTABLIS HENT BEFORE EVERSON
"Our system at the federal and state levels is presently honey-
combed" with governmental financing of religious exercises, Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas has said."8 But, as he footnoted there and stated else-
where, 9 it is not the product of a recent hive. The bees were busy
long, long ago, even in the First Congress which wrote the first
amendment.7 ' To be sure, as long ago as 1817 Congress subsidized
religious education among the Indian tribes, a practice which con-
tinued until the turn of the century.7 Yet an establishment issue was
never put before the Court until Bradfield v. Roberts"2 in 1899. There
Joseph Bradfield, a citizen and taxpayer of the United States and a
03 Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 15.
04 McCollum v. Board of Educ., supra note 16.
or Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
68 Engel v. Vitale, supra note 5.
67 Mr. Justice Douglas spelled out some of his views on the problem of standing
to sue and launched an attack on the doctrine of political questions in THE GaEAT
RIGHTS, supra note 32; concisely stated his views on various aspects of "separation
of Church and State" in A LIviNG BILL OF RiGHTS, supra note 36; and has stated
that governmental aid to parochial schools would be unconstitutional; AN ANATOMY
OF LIBERTY, supra note 34.08 Engel v. Vitale, supra note 5, at 437.
69 Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 19, at 313.
70 The First Congress provided for chaplains in both Houses and in the armed
services. Journals of Congress, VI, 1033. See also, footnote 1 of Mr. Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion in Engel v .Vitale, 370 U.S. at 437.
71 President Jefferson's treaty with the Kaskasia Indians, e.g., provided for the
subvention of a priest of the Catholic Church. 1 Am. State Papers, Class. 2, Indian
Affairs 687 (Cong. 1803). The practice was discontinued, pursuant to Congressional
enactment, in 1897. Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, #1, 30 Stat. 79. A history of this
practice will be found in Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
72175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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resident of the District of Columbia, challenged, as an establishment
of religion, an appropriation by Congress to Providence Hospital,
"a private eleemosynary corporation ... composed of members of a
monastic order or sisterhood of the Roman Catholic Church, 73 pur-
suant to a contract between the hospital and the Commissioners of
the District of Columbia. Mr. Justice Peckham, for a unanimous
court, replied to the Bradfield allegations:
Whether the individuals who compose the corporation under its
charter happen to be all Roman Catholics, or all Methodists, or
Presbyterians, or Unitarians, or members of any other religious
organization, or of no organization at all is of not the slightest con-
sequence with reference to the law of its incorporation, nor can the
individual beliefs upon religious matters of the various incorporators
be inquired into. Nor is it material that the hospital may be conducted
under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. To be conducted
under the auspices is to be conducted under the influence or patronage
of that church. The meaning of the allegation is that the church
exercises great and perhaps controlling influence over the management
of the hospital. It must, however, be managed pursuant to the law of
its being. That the influence of any particular church may be powerful
over the members of a non-sectarian and secular corporation, incor-
porated for a certain defined purpose and with clearly stated powers,
is surely not sufficient to convert such a corporation into a religious
or sectarian body. That fact does not alter the legal character of the
corporation, which is incorporated under an act of Congress, and its
powers, duties and character are to be solely measured by the charter
under which it alone has any legal existence.74
A religious establishment, then, is not synonymous with an establish-
ment of religion and a Congressional grant to the former does not
result in the latter, not, at least, where the religious establishment
serves the secular purpose of "keeping a hospital in the city of
Washington for the care of such sick and invalid persons as may
place themselves under the treatment and care of the corporation.175
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 6 decided nine years later, considered pay-
ments made by the Secretary of Interior to the Bureau of Catholic
Indian Missions to provide for the religious education of the Sioux.
The Constitutional issue was not pressed before the court. Chief
Quick Bear had argued only that the appropriation was contrary to
a legislative enactment of Congress. 7 This argument based on the
73Id. at 297. 76 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
74 Id. at 298. 77 Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, § 1, 30 Stat. 79.
75 Id. at 299-300.
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legislated policy of Congress, as well as any Constitutional issue that
might have been raised, was nicely disposed of by noting that the
payments came from "treaty funds" and "trust funds," treasuries
which belonged to the Sioux in the first place and, therefore, the
Court concluded, the case did not involve an appropriation of federal
funds. The Court observed that some reference had been made "to
the Constitution in respect to this contract with the Bureau of Catholic
Indian Missions" and, citing Bradfield v. Roberts, somewhat duplici-
tously replied, "It is not contended that it is unconstitutional and it
could not be." 8
Establishment next came before the Court in Arver v. United
States,," in 1918, when the selective draft law's exemption of ministers
and of students in divinity and theological schools was challenged.
The challenge was given curt and summary disposition in a single
sentence,
And we pass without anything but statement the proposition that an
establishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise
thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemp-
tion clauses of the act to which we at the outset referred, because we
think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more. 0
Finally, in 1930, came Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ."'
An establishment issue was surely presented. Louisiana had provided
secular textbooks, free of charge, to children attending church-related
elementary schools. The Court resolved the first amendment issue
by simply ignoring it. It found that education, including the secular
education provided by church-related schools, served a public purpose
and that, therefore, the textbook gratuity did not constitute a taking
of the taxpayers' property for private interests so as to deny petitioners
due process of law. While the establishment issue was by-passed in
Cochran the Court's holding became an essential ingredient of the
majority's ruling in Everson v. Board of Educ.2
EVERSON TO ENGEL
Some have questioned the accuracy of Mr. justice Black's historical
discourse in Everson v. Board of Educ. Others have been disturbed
by his balancing, on an historical scale, religion with irreligion." In
78 210 U.S. at 81.
70 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
80 Id. at 389-90.
81281 U.S. 370 (1930).
82330 U.S. 1 (1947).83 For a recent study and appraisal of the principal views, pro and con, respecting
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sustaining the right of Ewing Township to provide free bus transpor-
tation for children attending parochial school, 4 he did, however, read
with precision and apply precisely his judicial precedents. Speaking
for the Court's majority, including Mr. Justice Douglas, and on the
authority of Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., he wrote:
It is much too late to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the
opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no public
purpose .... The same thing is no less true of legislation to reimburse
needy parents, or all parents, for payment of the fares of their children
so that they can ride in public busses to and from schools rather than
run the risk of traffic and other hazards incident to walking or "hitch-
hiking.".... Nor does it follow that a law has a private rather than a
public purpose because it provides that tax raised funds will be paid to
reimburse individuals on account of money spent by them in a way
which furthers a public program. 85
This is the lesson of Bradfield v. Roberts, a lesson which has been
taught by the Court's majority for over sixty years.8"
Everson thus stated that which could be done. It also told us that
which could not be done: neither a state nor the Federal Government
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. The alternative (between what may and may
not be done) here offered religion is not an Hobson's Choice as Mr.
Justice Douglas seems now to make it. Mr. Justice Black did no more
than demand complete equality for those who believed in God (his
Everson concept of religion, a concept which was given a wry twist
in Torcaso v. Watkins) 7 and those who chose not to believe. Religion,
qua religion, could no more be the victim of governmental discrimin-
ation than it could be the recipient of its bounty. From this point of
view only a law couched in exclusively religious terms and enacted for
an exclusively religious purpose would offend the first amendment.
The Everson rationale was rigidly applied in McCollum v. Board of
Educ.8" but, to the surprise of its author, 9 relaxed in Zorach v.
Everson and McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), see HEALEY, JEFFER-
SON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION (1962), particularly ch. 1.84 The reimbursement went only to parents of children attending Catholic schools
because there were no other private schools in the school district. Mr. Justice Black
assumed, validly enough, that the New Jersey statute would have been applied by
New Jersey courts to provide transportation for children attending all private
schools. 330 U.S. at 4-5.
1 330 U.S. at 7.
86 From Bradfield v. Roberts, decided in 1899, to McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961).
87367 U.S. 488 (1961), discussed infra notes 100 & 101 and accompanying text.
88 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
89 Mr. Justice Black dissenting in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
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Clauson.9° The in-school religious instruction which young Terry
McCollum was required to eschew was designed to promote all
religions to the embarrassment of those minors who formed a minority
of non-conformists. Apparently it was not the coercive effect of the
embarrassment which constituted the establishment of religion. Engel
later told us that coercion is not of the essence of establishment. 1
For this reason Zorach v. Clauson might sound like an essay in
semantics. The New York released time program considered in
Zoraclz was, quite obviously, purely religious in motivation and in
design. Mr. Justice Douglas, turning a page of history, wrote that we
follow "the best of our traditions" when the state "encourages religious
instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs." 2 But when he at the
same time declared, "We follow the McCollum case,193 the logic
became somewhat elusive. Mr. Justice Brennan put the thought in
different terms which seem to bring us closer to the element of coer-
cion. Concurring in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp.
The crucial difference, I think, was that the McCollum program
offended the Establishment Clause while the Zorach program did not.
This was not, in my view, because of the difference in public expendi-
tures involved. True, the McCollum program involved the regular use
of school facilities, classrooms, heat and light and time from the
regular school day-even though the actual incremental cost may have
been negligible. All religious instruction under the Zorach program,
by contrast, was carried on entirely off the school premises, and the
teacher's part was simply to facilitate the children's release to the
Churches. The deeper difference was that the McCollum program
placed the religious instructor in the public school classroom in pre-
cisely the position of authority held by the regular teachers of secular
subjects, while the Zorach program did not. The McCollum program,
in lending to the support of sectarian instruction all the authority of
the governmentally operated public school system, brought govern-
ment and religion into that proximity which the Establishment Clause
forbids. To be sure, a religious teacher presumably commands sub-
stantial respect and merits attention in his own right. But the Con-
stitution does not permit that prestige and capacity for influence to be
augmented by investiture of all the symbols of authority at the com-
mand of the lay teacher for the enhancement of secular instruction. 5
O 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
91 370 U.S. at 430.
92 343 U.S. at 313-14.
93 Id. at 315.
94 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Or Id. at 1592-93.
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Be that as it may, the majority view of Everson was revisited and
reaffirmed in May, 1961, in the conglomeration of opinions which the
Court read to sustain Sunday Closing Laws.9" Mr. Chief Justice
Warren found in these laws a state sponsorship of rest and recreation,
quasi-health measures contrived to promote the temporal welfare
rather than the ecclesiastic. Commencing from that premise I do not
suppose that anyone could fault his conclusion,
However, it is equally true that the "Establishment" Clause does
not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect
merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or
all religions. In many instances, the Congress or state legislatures
conclude that the general welfare of society, wholly apart from any
religious considerations, demands such regulation. Thus, for temporal
purposes, murder is illegal. And the fact that this agrees with the
dictates of the Judaeo-Christian religions while it may disagree with
others does not invalidate the regulation. So too with the questions of
adultery and polygamy .... The same could be said of theft, fraud, etc.,
because those offenses were also proscribed in the Decalogue9 7
Noble judicial emotions must have been expurgated in the course
of the various Sunday Closing Law opinions. Only a month later,
almost unnoticed, a quiet unanimity descended upon the Court. Mr.
Justice Black, speaking for all of his colleagues who were present and
accounted for, found unconstitutional a Maryland statute which
required its citizens to swear a belief in God in order to obtain a
commission as a notary public.98 Torcaso was an orthodox decision
tailored along traditional lines99 but Mr. Justice Black could not
90 The Sunday Closing Law cases, decided in 1961, were McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961), Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617(1961). In McGowan and in Two Guys, Black, Clark, Brennan, Whittaker and
Stewart concurred in the Court's opinion (the Chief Justice noting, however, in
McGowan that Mr. Justice Black was of the opinion that appellants had standing "to
sue with respect to the free exercise issue raised), while Frankfurter and Harlan also
concurred but Justice Frankfurter, with Harlan's concurrence, wrote a separate
opinion respecting the free exercise issue in all four cases. Brennan and Stewart
dissented in Braunfeld and Gallagher while Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in all four
cases.
97 366 U.S. at 442.
98 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Frankfurter and Harlan concurred
in the result. This was the first (and, to date, the only) unanimous decision of the
Court respecting the establishment clause (or issues related thereto) since Cochran
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., supra note 81, was decided in 1930. It is interest-
ing to note that all of the Court's decisions on this issue were unanimous prior to
Everson.
99 The religious test oath was particularly odious to those who wrote the Constitu-
tion. It was considered not only one of the ingredients of establishment but also a
violation of religious liberty. See, e.g., RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 297
et seq. (Farrand ed. 1937); TAYLOR, MASSACHUSETTS COLONY TO COM-MONWEALTH,
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resist the temptation to add an unorthodox footnote to his statement
that neither the state nor the Federal government "can constitutionally
pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against
non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in
the existence of God, as against those religions founded on different
beliefs."'1 0 In the footnote he wrote, "Among religions in this country
which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the
existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular
Humanism and others."' 0 '
Surely the Court's decisions and even an individual justice's inci-
dental observations are limited to the facts of the case before the
Court. This is an ancient rule of construction. The Torcaso concept
of religion should be confined to the Torcaso case but it does have
disturbing elements if cast in the context of McCollum and Engel.
For, if we forbid the teaching of recognized religions in our public
schools and forbid a prayer which simply acknowledges the existence of
God and at the same time permit-as, indeed, we must-the teaching of
some code of ethical conduct, some system of value norms, does not
the system which the school then sponsors become the system of
Secular Humanism or simply secular humanism? Do we not then
prefer, in public education, one religion, Secular Humanism, over
other religions which are founded upon a belief in the existence of
God? The Torcaso concept of religion is one which well might plague
the Court in cases yet to be argued. It is, in fact, some part of my
cause for questioning the reasoning of Mr. Justice Douglas in Engel
v. Vitale.
DOUGLAS OF ENGEL
After Engel the Court, in companion cases decided in June, 1963,
struck down a Pennsylvania statute which required the reading,
without comment, of ten verses of the Holy Bible at the opening of
public elementary school classes0 2 and a Maryland school district
rule which embraced a similar reading of the Bible as well as a volun-
tary recitation of the Lord's Prayer. 0 Both cases were logical exten-
sions of Engel and were handled in the Everson to Engel tradition. In
120 (1961) ; 3 WmINGS OF JA.mS MADisoN 206 (Hunt ed. 1900-10). The Constitu-
tion in article VI provides that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."
10D 367 U.S. at 495.
101 Ibid.
102 School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203.
10 Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203.
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a "compact and exact summation"" 4 of the majority's views on estab-
lishment Mr. Justice Clark wrote,
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legisla-
tive power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that
to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be
a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion. 10
5
Here, in essence, we have a restatement of the Everson rationale.
Does Mr. Justice Douglas accept today what he held in 1947? Appar-
ently not. For in Engel he now shakes the Everson foundations and,
it seems, would now reconstruct upon its ruins the Everson dissent of
Mr. Justice Rutledge." 6 If we are now to discard the Everson holding
I do not see how we can possibly pay a proper respect to the liberty
of the parent who prefers private to public education or who prefers
the secular education of the religious school to the secular education of
the public school. Rutledge had an answer of sorts which Douglas
seems now to accept. Mr. Justice Rutledge said,
No one would claim today that the Amendment is constricted, in
"prohibiting the free exercise" of religion, to securing the free exercise
of some formal or creedal observance, of one sect or of many. It
secures all forms of religious expression, creedal, sectarian or non-
sectarian, wherever and however taking place, except conduct which
trenches upon the like freedoms of others or clearly and presently
endangers the community's good order and security. For the protec-
tive purposes of this phase of the basic freedom, street preaching, oral
or by distribution of literature, has been given "the same high estate
under the First Amendment as .. .worship in the churches and
preaching from the pulpits." And on this basis parents have been held
entitled to send their children to private, religious schools. Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510. Accordingly, daily religious educa-
tion commingled with secular is "religion" within the guaranty's
comprehensive scope. So are religious training and teaching in what-
ever form. The word connotes the broadest content, determined not
by the form or formality of the teaching or where it occurs, but by its
essential nature regardless of those details.
"Religion" has the same broad significance in the twin prohibition
104 The first amendment "is the compact and exact summation of its author's views
formed during his long struggle for religious freedom." Mr. Justice Rutledge dissent-
ing in Everson v. Board of Educ. 330 U.S. at 31.
10 5 374 U.S. at 222.
106 330 U.S. at 28.
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concerning "an establishment." The Amendment was not duplicitous.
"Religion" and "establishment" were not used in any formal or tech-
nical sense. The prohibition broadly forbids state support, financial or
other, of religion in any guise, form or degree. It outlaws all use of
public funds for religious purposes.107
Pierce,"8 of course, said no such thing. It made no mention of either
religious liberty, free exercise, establishment or the first amendment.
There were in fact two appellees in the Pierce case-the Society of
Sisters, an Oregon corporation which conducted a parochial school,
and Hill Military Academy, an Oregon corporation which conducted
a private secular school. The Court found in the business pursuits of
the appellees an economic interest sufficient to permit them to chal-
lenge the Oregon statute which would have closed all but the public
schools of the state. Permitting the challenge, the Court then acknowl-
edged and affirmed the right of the parent to send his child to any
private school, secular or religious, whose secular curriculum satisfies
the educational standards set by the state. The Oregon statute, there-
fore, deprived Oregon parents of liberty, and the respondent corpor-
ations of property, without due process of law. If Pierce has any
pertinency to the first amendment it is only in the fashion of Cochran
since the Court in Pierce implicitly recognized the secular purpose
served by the parochial school.
Excise the Pierce error and Mr. Justice Rutledge is left with an
assumption which, unsupported and unproved, he turns into law. And
it is a strange tenet, indeed, which equates attendance at a church-
related school with attendance at church and which transforms a
secular education into a religious exercise. Surely we cavort with
fancy if the first amendment means that a student of law-be he
Catholic, Protestant, Jew, Moslem, Secular Humanist, atheist or
agnostic-sitting in a lecture hall at Fordham l0 or pleading his case in
a moot court room at Syracuse1 ' is engaged in a religious exercise. It
is all well and good for Mr. Justice Douglas to tell us that the religious
colporteur selling his tracts on Boston Common"' or ringing his
neighbor's door bell" 2 is engaged in a religious exercise. Or to suggest
that a Mormon when he takes a second wife" or an Edna Ballard
when she solemnly declares that she is really Joan of Arc or St.
107 Id. at 32-33.
108 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).100 Fordham University is Catholic church-related.
110 Syracuse University is Methodist church-related.
111 Supra note 53. 112 Supra note 56. 113 Supra note 60.
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Germain.t 4 is engaged in a religious exercise. These are free exercise
decisions. They teach us that government cannot compel an examin-
ation of conscience or put an individual to the proof of his belief. No
one can, with reason, be alarmed when Mr. Justice Douglas shows
zealous concern for the freedom of the Sikh, the Moslem, the Mormon
or an Edna Ballard. Liberty is a native concern of all of us. Religion
may be a private affair but the characterization one gives to his activi-
ties is not a private affair. If it were, then religion itself might well
become not a private but a fanciful affair.
This is part of the danger of the Rutledge reasoning. When it is
compounded by Torcaso's concept of religion and then applied to the
establishment clause separation or neutrality115 becomes a slippery
shibboleth. If religion need not be predicated on a belief in God or
even in a god and if it may not be tested by the common consensus of
what reasonable men would reasonably call religion, if it is so private
that-so long as it does not inflict injury on society-it is immured
from governmental interference and from judicial inquiry, does not
religion then become what you or I or Malcolm X may choose to call
religion? By this reasoning might not a group of gymnasts proclaiming
on their trampolines that physical culture is their religion be engaged in
a religious exercise? And if Congress, in a particular Olympic year,
appropriated funds to subsidize their calisthenics would this not be,
in the Rutledge-Douglas view, an establishment of religion? It seems
to me it would and it seems to me that this is quite wrong.
The error, I believe, lies not only in the very liberal defining of
religion but in joining, Siamese fashion, the free exercise concept of
religion with the concept of religion found in the establishment
clause. An individual's right to the free exercise of his religion involves
not only belief but speech and acts and, as a result of the latter, the
free exercise clause is aided and abetted in its application by the
guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and others
found elsewhere in the Constitution.116 Indeed, Supreme Court de-
114 Supra note 61.
115 The metaphorical phrase "separation of Church and state" which pervades the
opinions of the Court in Everson, McColIon and Zorach seems now to have been
abandoned. In School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, Mr. Justice Clark spoke instead
of the "wholesome neutrality" between Church and State. 374 U.S. at 222.
116 The first amendment reads in full, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The due process clause
has also been used to support forms of religious liberty. In addition to Pierce v.
Society of Sisters see, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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cisions at times make it difficult to determine whether the Court's
ruling is rested on the guaranty of free speech, or the guaranty of
freedom of the press, or the guaranty of freedom of assembly or the
free exercise clause or a combination of all of these. 17 Consequently
"religion" as found in the free exercise clause is a broader concept
than "religion" as found in the establishment clause.
There is a second vice in the Rutledge reasoning. He held that since
the church-related school and its students demanded, as an exercise
of religion, the right to exist they must be precluded from seeking
government assistance for what now must be taken as a religious
practice. Having put yourself in the vise, he seems to tell the student
at the church-related school, you must now suffer the pinch. This
dialectic writes a quasi--estoppel into the first amendment and its
last result is no more than a play on words. It is rather unusual
reasoning which would permit principles of estoppel to decide very
fundamental issues of our fundamental law.
In any event, the result certainly does not sit well with the liberty
which Mr. Justice Douglas has always been ready to defend. If the
state is forbidden to provide bus transportation to the child attending
parochial school what liberty is offered to the invalid child of destitute
or semi-destitute parents?11 Must he, as a practical matter, be con-
fined by the Constitution to a public education or none at all? And
what of the healthy child? Mr. Michael Quill has on several
occasions, notably when it served the bargaining position of his Trans-
port Workers' Union, brogued the suggestion that the City of New
York subsidize its subway system in toto and that all city commuters
be permitted to enjoy their subways free of charge. 19 Would the
student attending the church-related school then be left with only the
power of his young legs to continue his secular education or, in the
alternative, would the Transit Authority be required to charge him an
appropriate fare? It seems to me, that the Rutledge who wrote in
Everson, "the cost of transportation here is inseparable from both
117 See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 159 (1943), where Mr.
Chief Justice Stone wrote, "The ordinance as applied is held to be an unconstitutional
abridgment of free speech, press and religion...."
118 This is not an emotional question. The statute which, in Judd v. Board of
Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938), a New York court found unconstitutional
provided for free bus transportation for physically handicapped children attending
private schools.
119 This proposal has been advanced by Mr. Quill off and on over a period of
several years. He raised the issue again in December, 1963 during his negotiations
with the New York City Transit Authority.
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religious and secular teaching at the religious school,"' 2 offers no
other choice. Would the student of the religious school then find
equality under the law? Without equality liberty can lose its meaning.
And equality, Mr. Justice Douglas has written, "seems a fragile thing
without institutions to espouse and defend it.''.
Are we pushing the Rutledge rationale to an absurd extreme? Per-
haps so, but if the rule can be brought to the point of absurdity there
is every reason to question the validity of the rule in the first place.
Perhaps, too, Mr. Justice Douglas would not travel so far along the
Rutledge path. He may have indicated as much in June of last year
when he concurred, in a separate opinion,'22 in the Court's decision in
Sherbert v. Verner.' There the Court ruled that South Carolina
could not so apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment com-
pensation law as to deny benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who, by
reason of religious scruples, refused employment which would have
required her to work on Saturday. Thus the state cannot make its
public welfare disbursements in a way which would penalize a citizen
because of his religious beliefs. To do so would be to discriminate
against him because of those beliefs. Sherbert v. Verner was, however,
a free exercise decision and apparently Mr. Justice Douglas would
not apply its rationale to the establishment clause. Isn't that what he
meant in the concluding paragraph of his opinion,
If appellant is otherwise qualified for unemployment benefits, pay-
ments will be made to her not as a Seventh-day Adventist, but as an
unemployed worker. Conceivably these payments will indirectly bene-
fit her church, but no more so than does the salary of any public
employee. Thus, this case does not involve the problems of direct or
indirect state assistance to a religious organization-matters relevant
to the Establishment Clause, not in issue here.124
Since she is a religious woman and presumably charitable, con-
cededly the payments made to Adell Sherbert will indirectly benefit
her church. The payments thus made, therefore, do not conflict with
the establishment clause but that is so because Adell Sherbert was
compensated as an unemployed worker and the benefit to her church
was only indirect. Is the same not true of the Veterans' education bill
120Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 29 (1947) (footnote 3 of dissenting
opinion).
12 1 THE GREAT RIGHTS, 117 (Cahn ed. 1963).
122 374 U.S. at 410.
123 374 U.S. 398.
124 Id. at 411.
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of World War II? The veteran was given an educational bounty
because he was a veteran and this regardless of whether he chose a
state-operated university, a private non-sectarian university or a
church-related college. He made the choice and was free to make the
choice. When he chose a church-related college was the benefit any
less indirect than in the case of Adell Sherbert? Her voluntary charity
and his voluntary choice built the wall between the state and the
church.
To condemn, as Douglas does in Engel, the educational aspects of
the "G.I. Bill of Rights"'25 poses a final problem which takes us back
to the matter mentioned at the outset. Mr. Justice Douglas would
condemn as well Presidential Thanksgiving proclamations.' But who
is there to sue? Who has standing to bring the issue before the Court?
DOUGLAS AND STANDING TO SUE
The jurisdiction of federal courts is cast in terms of "case or con-
troversy."' 7 The Court does not, and cannot, sit to render advisory
opinions.'28 Frothingham v. Mellon 2" held that a taxpayer of the
United States, solely in her guise as a taxpayer, has no standing to
challenge Congressional appropriations. Mrs. Frothingham's interest
in federal appropriations was too remote and too infinitesimal. Froth-
ingham recognized, however, the standing of a local taxpayer to chal-
lenge appropriations of a state legislature, at least where state law
itself permits the challenge.' Doremus v. Board of Educ.'8' explained
Frothingham's rule in the church-state context. In Doremus appellant
Klein, the parent of a pupil in the Hawthorne (N.J.) High School and
a taxpayer of the Borough of Hawthorne sought to challenge the
compulsory reading, pursuant to a state statute, of five verses of the
Old Testament at the opening of classes each day. The New Jersey
courts sustained the statute but before the case reached the United
States Supreme Court Mr. Klein's daughter had graduated. Quite
obviously the situation was unlike that presented in McCollum or in
Murray v. Curlett.12 Terry McCollum and William J. Murray III
were students still attending their respective schools when their cases
125 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962).
126 Ibid.
127 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
128 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
129 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
130 Id. at 486-87.
'31342 U.S. 429 (1952).
132374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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were heard and decided. They were exposed then and there to an
alleged violation of their religious liberty. As professed atheists they
were the alleged victims of governmental coercion brought to bear
against their beliefs and in favor of religion. Mr. Klein's daughter,
having graduated, was no longer in such jeopardy and no decision
which the Court could then render "would protect any rights she may
have once had." ' 3 Mr. Klein, as noted, was also a taxpayer of the
Borough of Hawthorne. The few moments spent in reading five verses
of the Old Testament, however, imposed no financial burden on him
which he did not already have. Whether his daughter and her class-
mates read the Bible or not, the same school tax was paid by him at
the same rates and in the same amounts. From the taxpayer's point
of view the case was quite different from Everson v. Board of Educ.
Everson "showed a measurable appropriation or disbursement of
school district funds"' 3 occasioned by the reimbursement of trans-
portation costs to the parents of children attending parochial school.
In Doremus the motion to dismiss the appeal was, therefore, granted." 5
Engel was quite like McCollum. The ten children whose parents
brought the action were still enrolled in the public schools in New
Hyde Park, N.Y. There was obviously standing to sue in the McCol-
lur sense. But Engel was not a good-faith pocketbook action in the
Everson sense. As in Doremus appellants' school district taxes re-
mained the same whether or not the children prayed. Thus appellants
standing to sue turned on the presence or absence of the element of
coercion. Yet in ruling on the merits of the case Mr. Justice Douglas
found,
No student, however, is compelled to take part. The respondents have
adopted a regulation which provides that "Neither teachers nor any
school authority shall comment on participation or non-participation
... nor suggest or request that any posture or language be used or
dress be worn or be not used or not worn." Provision is also made for
excusing children, upon written request of a parent or guardian, from
the saying of the prayer or from the room in which the prayer is said.
A letter implementing and explaining this regulation has been sent to
each taxpayer and parent in the school district. As I read this regu-
lation, a child is free to stand or not stand, to recite or not recite,
without fear of reprisal or even comment by the teacher or any other
school official.
In short, the only one who need utter the prayer is the teacher;
133 342 U.S. at 433.
134 Id. at 434.
135 1d. at 435.
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and no teacher is complaining of it. Students can stand mute or even
leave the classroom, if they desire.186
The first amendment, by its express terms, operates to restrict
Congress alone. It operates to restrict states but only by reason of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.17 The fourteenth
amendment forbids a state to "deny any person life, liberty or property
without due process of law." There was no taking of life and no
taking of property by the recital of the Regents' Prayer. And if there
be no element of coercion, no invasion of appellants' liberty, how, it
may be asked, could there be any violation of due process of law?
However reasonable the argument might be, and however valid his-
torically, it searches for an understanding of due process of law which,
I am sure, is irretrievably gone. The cumulative effect of Everson,
McCollum, Engel and many decisions of the Court respecting freedom
of speech,""8 freedom of assembly" 9 and freedom of the press 4' is to
incorporate, verbatim as it were, the first amendment into the four-
teenth amendment so that a state law inconsistent with the dictates of
the first amendment is, per se, a denial of due process of law.
Are we to assume, then, that since coercion in the McCollum sense
was actually present in Engel and since there was a bona fide standing
to sue, Mr. Justice Douglas' emphasis on the absence of coercion, as
well as Mr. Justice Black's findings on the same subject, 1 was an
exercise in irrelevancy? The inference comes too easily to be correct.
Douglas dissented in Doremus42 and he has amplified the reason for
his dissent.
In his James Madison lecture given last year at New York Univer-
sity he stated that parts of the Constitution contain "partial prohibi-
tions, such as those against 'unreasonable' searches and seizures in the
Fourth Amendment and 'excessive' bail in the Eighth" while others are
"in the form of commands, such as 'Congress shall make no law...
abridging freedom of speech' in the First Amendment." 4 3 While the
partial prohibitions may be only admonitions to moderation the
"guarantees that the farmers phrased in terms of commands with no
qualifications would seem," he said, "to be in a 'preferred' category." "
186 370 U.S. at 438.
137 "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."
138 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
139 See, e.g., Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
140 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
141 370 U.S. at 430. 143 THE GREAT RIGHTS, 128-9 (Calm ed. 1963).
142 342 U.S. at 435. 144 Ibid.
19641
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
It is an interesting and plausible theory but, so far as I know, no
historical evidence has ever been found to establish even a prima facie
case on its behalf. On the contrary, Mr. Madison himself did not
think that the first amendment was even necessary since the federal
government was not given the power to legislate in those areas to
begin with.'45 In addition, the Douglas theory produces a most ques-
tionable conclusion. It enables him to assert that "First Amendment
rights are by nature of the constitutional command so preferred that
taxpayers should be given standing to protect them, and that the more
vague, generalized rights of due process involved in other cases require
that one who makes the challenge have a more specific, tangible inter-
est at stake..14  Douglas, therefore, disagrees with Doremus but
might be willing to accept Frothinghain.4'
We are seated now, I would submit, before a double portion of
supposition. While not only is there no evidence that its draftsmen
intended a preferment for the first amendment, there is in addition
nothing to support the theory that the jurisdictional section of article
III of the Constitution was to have a dual application. Article III
limits the Court's jurisdiction to "cases and controversies." Only
those who have a genuine interest, who have suffered or are threatened
with tangible injury to life, liberty or property, who have a bona fide
standing to sue are permitted to plead before the Court.'48 I should
not think that a court's jurisdiction can be built upon or altered by
the gradations of the rights which parties seek to enforce. I should
not think that "cases and controversies" can be given one meaning
with respect to the first amendment, another meaning with respect to
the fourth amendment and possibly yet another meaning with respect
to guarantees which were embodied in the Constitution as it read
before amendment. If "cases and controversies" is susceptible to a
chameleon construction then the Court might sit, for certain parties at
least, as an advisory tribunal, a sort of super-parliament prepared to
pass upon academic and perhaps abstract questions of Constitutional
law. Is it "proper to take alarm at the first experiment"'49 on the
Court's jurisdiction? Jurisdiction once taken has a tendency to grow.
145 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 132 (Hunt ed. 1900-10).
146 THE GREAT RIGHTS, 140 (Cahn ed. 1963).
147 Ibid.
148 For a concise statment of the limitations on the Court's jurisdiction see the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936).
149 James Madison wrote, "It is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our
liberties." See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962).
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It feeds upon exercise. This is in the nature of courts as it is of any
other agency of government. It is in the nature of man himself.
We might ask whether this be the very fear with which Jefferson
was possessed.15 0 Should we, in a respectful way, turn again to that
"great author" of Virginia's "great statute of religious freedom""'
-the philosopher who affirmed that we are endowed by our Creator
with certain inalienable rights," 2 the teacher who recognized the con-
tent and continuities of life and who taught that the inculcation of the
benevolence of God is essential to education if education is to produce
moral men, 5' the legislator who urged that we construe our Constitu-
tion with attention to "the sprit manifested in the debates, and instead
of trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, conform to the
probable one in which it was passed"' 5 -- and weigh again his words to
Livingston: "One single object .... will entitle you to the endless grat-
itude of society; that of restraining judges from usurping legislation.""
2&0 Supra note 28.
151 Justice Rutledge characterizations. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 29
(1947).
152 Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776.
153 HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION, 160 (1962).
IL4 X THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 78 (Lipscomb & Bergh ed. 1903).
155 Letter to Edward Livingston, id., XVI, 113-14.
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